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19 March 1954

Draft Terms of Reference, IAC Watch Committee

Proposed Additional Paragraph

C. Functions

* * * * *

4. to make any appropriate recommendations to the IAC.

Army/Navy/USAF/DIA/JCS Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

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G-2 proposal, distributed
by the Secretary with
minutes of the 18th
meeting Ad Hoc IAC
(March 1954).



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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18 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Ad Hoc Committee (Watch)

Subject: Addenda to Minutes of 12 March 1954
Meeting (OCI 4420)

1. In reviewing the minutes of subject meeting, I note that my remarks were not included. Since those remarks reflect the views of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, it is requested that they be added to the minutes.

2. My remarks were essentially as follows:

a. As a member of the Watch Committee for the past two years, it has always been my opinion that as a minimum, the Watch Committee was fulfilling its mission if it could give warning of an impending attack on a week to week basis. Of course it would be desirable to give more advanced warning, but at the very least it should give the week's warning already mentioned. Though we recognized the ability of the USSR to initiate hostilities, with little or no warning using aircraft, we generally believed that we would have some advanced warning of an impending ground force attack. However, even in this case, an attack of limited scope could be launched with little warning.

b. I can echo Captain Eller's remarks about there never being any question about the Watch Committee's mission with the Watch Committee itself. However, due to a lack of strong indications of hostilities, the Watch Committee did, in fact, normally discuss many other matters that might have been the forerunners of such indicators.

*Submitted to Secretary at
18th Ad Hoc IAC Committee
and included Verbatim
minutes of meeting.*

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
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c. I believe that some of our difficulties over arriving at agreed wording for the various parts of the terms of reference comes from our considering the parts of the document out of context. Truly enough, it may be desirable to have the parts so worded that they will stand by themselves, but it appears to be overly difficult. In my opinion, what we are working for is a draft of the terms of reference which presents a clear picture of the Watch Committee's duties when it is considered as a whole. Admittedly, there may be some duplication, or unavoidable interlocking of the various parts in the final draft, but such a condition is not considered objectionable.

d. As for the definition of hostile intentions, I do not believe that we need a 3-page document to explain that. What we are thinking about is the initiation of a "shooting war". As now written, the definitions would impose on the Watch Committee the responsibility for giving warning of the imminence of many activities which in themselves may, or may not, be indicators of the imminence of hostilities. I am opposed to using such a broad interpretation as a definition of hostile actions in defining the Watch Committee's mission.



NEIL M. WALLACE
Colonel, Arty.
Acting Representative for JIG

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In order to properly place the Watch Committee function within the Intelligence Community, it is recommended that an additional footnote be provided under 2 a of paragraph C as follows:

** "It is of first importance to recognize such hostile intentions as far in advance as possible, but the Watch Committee will confine its deliberations leading to conclusions to the evaluation of current evidence of immediate hostile action and leave to that organization which is so charged by the IAC the responsibility for long-range indications leading to national estimates."

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Navy proposal - Distributed
at 1719 meeting to each member
Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch)

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m
The Mission of providing earliest possible warning is the
most important ~~and~~ responsibility of the IAC to the NSC
and will be undertaken by the IAC Agencies as their highest
priority.

Collection

Dictated at ¹⁷~~16~~ meeting
Ad Hoc IAC Committee (watch)
and distributed to each
member - 12 March 1954

DEFINITIONS:

1. The term "hostile actions" includes actions of all types which may be undertaken by enemy forces, organizations, and individuals in support of military strategy aimed at affecting directly or indirectly, and in a substantial manner, the security of the United States.

2. Specifically, it includes the following types of hostile actions:

a. Those which are primarily "violent" in nature:

(1) Military action in the traditional sense, such as mobilization movements and operations of regular military forces which are based on Soviet orbit territory;

(2) Military support action by communist operators of whatever nationality and organizational ties undertaken to enhance, supplement or substitute for military action, including, for example, the clandestine delivery of atomic weapons and BW agents, and the operating of electronic devices, such as guidance systems---these operations to be effected in countries not under Soviet control, including the United States.

(3) Paramilitary action, such as mobilization, movements and operations by guerrilla and partisan forces.

(4) Subversive actions in the form of sabotage, terror, assassination of key military and political figures, military rebellions and violent uprisings under the direction of communist agents, all such actions being capable of producing military, economic or political crises.

Distributed to members of
Ad Hoc JAC Committee (watch)
at 14th meeting - 19 Feb 54
(Air Force Proposal) 73

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b. Those which, while "non-military" and "non-violent" in nature, may be under certain conditions the forerunners or the triggers of hostilities. (Whether such actions--many of which are going on all the time--will have a bearing on the imminence of hostilities will depend on their magnitude, rate of development, geographical location, their combination with other types of action, and the situation in general.):

(1) Political warfare action by communist and crypto-communist groups in legislative bodies, political parties and other organizations for the purpose of:

(a) Infiltrating, paralyzing, subverting and capturing non-communist organizations and governments, and

(b) Weakening and breaking free world alliances, fomenting conflicts among states of the free world, influencing or subverting vital U.S. policies, producing threats to U.S. forces overseas, and forcing U.S. withdrawals.

(2) Economic warfare action by communist and semi-communist states and communist organizations in the free world through methods designed to cripple economic output, including strikes in key factories and mass strikes, in order to:

(a) Produce economic crises and famines

(b) reduce the flow of commodities into the U.S. and other free industrial nations,

(c) cripple armament production

(d) debase currency, and

(e) interfere with the logistics of American armed

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forces, especially in overseas areas.

(3) Non-routine psychological warfare action, including efforts in the field of radio broadcasting, jamming, subversive publications, posters, movies, and plays for the purpose of:

(a) Stimulating or exploiting a major psychological crisis such as general demoralization and defeatism as well as lack of confidence in the local government and American leadership, and above all,

(b) Attempting to produce subversion in the armed forces of the free world, such as incitement to disobedience, desertion and mutiny,



(c) Attempting to achieve an inappropriate and untimely reorganization of these armed forces.

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Submitted at 12th meeting
5 Feb 54. by
Adm. Layton -

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
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USAF PROPOSAL - 1 Feb 54

- B. ~~Composition and Membership~~ + a chairman, to be appointed by the IAC for a specified period, an executive secretary, to be provided by CIA, and a senior official representing each IAC organization.

X. Composition and Organization of the Watch Committee:

The Watch Committee will be composed of a senior official representing each IAC organization, one of whom will be designated by the IAC as chairman for a specified period. The Committee will be supported by an Indications Center, headed by a Chief to be provided by _____, and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.



*Distributed 2 Feb 54
with M-11 -*

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Suggested version of Preamble for Watch Committee
Terms of Reference

The Soviet-Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate, at a time and place and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action inimical to the security of the United States. The mission of the Watch Committee therefore is an intelligence responsibility of paramount importance. The discharge of the Watch function, to provide earliest possible warning of such hostile action, will be undertaken by agencies of the IAC as a matter of the highest priority.

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*Submitted by Navy
at 11th Ad Hoc IAC
Committee (Watch)
Meeting, 29 Jan 1954*

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- h. prepare material for use by the Watch Committee as the basis for its deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

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Submitted by CIA
at 11th Ad Hoc IAC Committee
(Watch) Meeting Jan 54

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j. concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, to develop experimentally and test mechanical aids and techniques with a view eventually to assist in accomplishing the Watch Committee mission.

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*Submitted by CIA
at 1119 ADHOC IAC Committee
Meeting 40020031-3
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Arrange through the IAC for complete exploitation of
every domestic and foreign source of indications intelligence.

Submitted by G-2
at 10th Ad Hoc IAC
Committee (watch)
meeting - 18 Jan 54.

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DEFINITIONS:

1. The term(s) "hostile actions" (or "military, paramilitary, and other hostile actions") includes actions of all types which may be undertaken by enemy forces, organizations and individuals aimed at affecting directly or indirectly and in a substantial manner, the security of the United States.
2. Specifically, it includes the following types of hostile actions:
 - a. Military action in the traditional sense; such as mobilization movements and operations of regular military forces which are based on Soviet orbit territory;
 - b. Military support action by communist operators of whatever nationality and organizational ties undertaken to enhance, supplement or substitute for military action, including, for example, the clandestine delivery of atomic weapons and BW agents, and the operating of electronic devices, such as guidance systems---these operations to be effected in countries not under Soviet control, including the United States.
 - c. Paramilitary action; such as mobilization, movements and operations by guerrilla and partisan forces.
 - d. Subversive actions in the form of strikes in key factories, mass strikes, sabotage, mutiny, terror, including the assassination of key military and political figures, and military rebellions, under the direction of communist agents, all such actions being capable of producing military, economic or political crises.

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PROPOSED WATCH COMMITTEE INDICATIONS CENTER

8 December 1953

1. The Watch Committee will maintain an Indications Center which will:
 - a. Continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all ~~Federal~~ ^{National} intelligence agencies, for indications related to the Watch Committee's functions.
 - b. Request promptly an early evaluation and analysis of all reported indications from the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.
 - c. Arrange for a systematic screening by all ~~Federal~~ ^{National} intelligence agencies of intelligence information received by them by any means, ~~but~~ ^{Indications Center} not available to the ~~Indications Center~~ for the purpose of promptly extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding to the ~~latter~~ ^{Indications Center} all indications of Soviet-Communist ^{intentions relating to hostilities.} ~~preparations for attack.~~
 - d. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available intelligence indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack.
 - e. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively illustrate and interpret graphically the current situation and long-range trends with respect to Soviet-Communist preparations for offensive action.

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Read to Members of
the IAC Ad Hoc
Committee (watch) at
7th Meeting, 11 Dec 53
(incl in 11-7 as read)

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f. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch

Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee at regular and special meetings.

g. Prepare draft reports of the Watch Committee meetings and coordinate the review of such draft reports by the participating agencies.

h. Coordinate the reproduction and distribution of the Watch Committee Reports in final form.

i. Prepare plans for submission to the Watch Committee for systematizing, energizing and coordinating the worldwide collection by US agencies of indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack.

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Proposed paragraph 3. (Dissemination function')

"3. to report promptly their conclusions, together with ~~selected~~, significant indications, to the I.A.C. and other appropriate recipients"

accepted

Distributed to Members
of IAC Ad-HOC Committee (watch)
at Sixth Meeting 4 Dec '53

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Definition of Term "Hostile Action" (Paragraph C,2,a)

A single, or series of, event (s) which may lead to the commitment of US military forces.

*Distributed to members
of Ad Hoc IAC Committee (watch)
at their meeting - 13 Nov 53*

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*accepted
for submission*

SUGGESTED PRIORITY PARAGRAPH FOR WATCH COMMITTEE PAPER

Recognizing the implications of a surprise attack on the United States or areas of vital interest to its security and conceding the capability of the enemy to select the time, place and method of attack, it is agreed that the mission of the Watch Committee constitutes the most important responsibility of the intelligence community. This function will therefore be recognized as one which transcends all other intelligence efforts. The resources and capabilities of each of the IAC agencies will be devoted without reservation to achieve success in providing maximum warning.

*Air Force Submission -
Distributed to members*

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*Ad Hoc IAC Committee (weekly)
at third meeting 13 Nov. '53
73*

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Proposed Preamble to Terms of Reference for
Watch Committee of the IAC

Preamble: The discharge of the IAC Watch function will be undertaken
by the members of the IAC as a matter of the highest priority.

CIA Submission
Distributed to members
of Ad Hoc IAC Committee (watch)

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PROPOSED MISSION OF WATCH COMMITTEE

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States
Government of military or para military action by the USSR, or its
allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

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DRAFT

6-2 Submission -
Distributed to members
of Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch)
at third meeting - 13 Nov 1953
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

25 SEP 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. AIR FORCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Watch Committee Indications Center

1. Suggestions have been advanced recently for the establishment of a Watch Committee Indications Center which would perform the function of continuously integrating and tentatively evaluating and analysing all the indications collected by the U.S. intelligence agencies from all sources of Soviet-Communist preparations for war. Such an Indications Center would serve the vitally important purpose of providing a continuous concentration of all hostilities indications at a point where the collective knowledge and experience of all U.S. intelligence agencies would be available for evaluation and analysis. Further such a Center, in its operations, if not in its powers, would act as a guiding, unifying, and energizing force for the systematic collection of hostilities indications by all United States intelligence agencies.
2. A Watch Committee Indications Center would maintain wall maps, charts and other display material for most effectively illustrating and interpreting graphically the current situation and long-range trends with respect to Soviet-Communist preparations for offensive action. This requirement would be in addition to maintaining in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack. The staff of the Indications Center would also provide the necessary secretarial assistance to the Watch Committee.
3. An Indications Center, to act as a Watch Committee nerve center for what amounts to the worldwide intelligence early warning system of the United States can be established subject to the following:

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Distributed to members
of AG Hoc, AG Committee (Watch)
at first meeting - 30 Oct '53

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15 SEP 1988

a. Most important as a requirement is the wholehearted collaboration and support of the IAC members, particularly with respect to the prompt transmission to the Indications Center of all available indications, with a tentative evaluation and analysis.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army has agreed to provide the necessary space in a centralized location (in the Pentagon) within an area where indications from all sources may be handled.

c. A staff of eight, composed of personnel from CIA, State, and the three armed services, generally as set forth in paragraph 3 of Inclosure 1, will be needed. It is visualized that each agency representative would have a full-time assignment to the Indications Center where he would provide liaison and coordination with his own agency. He would be expected to search out and procure for the Indications Center all indications which have been received from all sources by his particular agency. He would also be expected to participate in the maintenance of the various collections, boards, charts, and maps of the Center, as well as to share the duties required for the secretarial support of the Watch Committee. For administrative reasons, it would appear advisable to have the initial Chief of the Center an Army officer, but once the activity has been firmly established it might be desirable to rotate the assignment among the agencies represented on the staff.

4. Inclosed are proposed terms of reference for the Watch Committee Indications Center (Inclosure 1).

5. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Committee approve the establishment of a Watch Committee Indications Center in accordance with the terms of reference set forth in the inclosure herewith.

1 Incl
Watch Committee Indications
Center

JOHN M. WILLEMS
Brigadier General, GS
Chairman, Watch Committee

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INCLOSURE 1

WATCH COMMITTEE INDICATIONS CENTER

1. Mission: The mission of the Watch Committee Indications Center of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is to assemble on a continuous basis at a central point all intelligence indications available to the U. S. Government of Soviet-Communist preparations for an attack on any country or countries outside the Iron Curtain.

2. Functions: The Indications Center will:

a. Continuously screen all available intelligence information received by electrical transmission by all Federal intelligence agencies for indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack;

b. Request promptly on early evaluation and analysis of all reported indications from the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs;

c. Arrange for a systematic screening by all Federal intelligence agencies of intelligence information received by them by any means, but not available to the Indications Center, for the purpose of promptly extracting, evaluating, analyzing, and forwarding to the latter all indications of Soviet-Communist preparation for attack;

d. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available intelligence indications of Soviet-Communist preparation for attack;

e. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively illustrate and interpret graphically the current situation and long-range trends with respect to Soviet-Communist preparations for offensive action (see Appendix);

f. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee at regular and special meetings;

g. Prepare draft reports of the Watch Committee meetings and coordinate the review of such draft reports by the participating agencies;

h. Coordinate the reproduction and distribution of the Watch Committee Reports in final form;

i. Prepare plans for submission to the Watch Committee for systematizing, energizing and coordinating the worldwide collection by U. S. agencies of indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack.

3. Personnel: The Chief of the Indications Center will also be the Secretary of the Watch Committee. The Center will be staffed by

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personnel from the agencies represented on the Watch Committee in accordance with allocations unanimously approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as follows:

- 1 Chief of Center (Lt Col or equivalent rank)
- 1 Navy Intelligence officer or specialist
- 1 Air Force Intelligence officer or specialist
- 1 CIA intelligence specialist
- 1 State intelligence specialist
- 1 Army intelligence specialist or officer
- 1 CIA research assistant
- 1 Army research assistant

4. Location: The Indications Center will be located in the area occupied by G-2/DA which will furnish the necessary communications equipment, office supplies, furniture, and security for the efficient accomplishment of the mission and functions of the Indications Watch Room.

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APPENDIX

PROPOSED WALL MATERIALS FOR INDICATIONS CENTER

A. MAPS

1. Location and movements of Soviet ground force units (down to divisions) behind the Iron Curtain.
2. Location of Soviet ground force units (down to divisions), supply bases, stockpiles, and main water, railway and highway communications in European Satellites (including East Germany) and the areas of the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, Veronesh, Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts of the Soviet Union.
3. Location and movements of European Satellite ground force units (down to divisions).
4. Location and movements of CCP, North Korean and Viet Minh ground units (down to divisions).
5. Location of EAF airfields, POL dumps and units.
6. Location of European Satellite Air Force units.
7. Location of Chinese Communist and North Korean Air Force airfields and units.
8. Location of Soviet submarines and major surface vessels.
9. Map of Iron Curtain area with principal rivers, railways, and cities.

B. CHARTS

1. *Indications of current week, with number of each indication placed on spot on Iron Curtain Map No. 9.
2. Consolidated graph of indications for current month.
3. Cumulative continuous graph of long-range indications from date of initiation.
4. Cumulative continuous graph of short-range indications from date of initiation.

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*The indications will be numbered in accordance with those on
FI's 1 and 2 of the map. Distinctions will be made between (a)
accepted, unconfirmed and rejected, and (b) white, black and gray
sources and, (c) long-range and short-range indications.

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COPY NO. 8

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP

WATCH COMMITTEE INDICATIONS CENTER

- References: a. G-2 Memo, same subject as above, distributed about 10 September 1953
b. Hq., ADC Memo, Subject: "Need for a World-Wide Indications System", dated 21 August 1953

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the advisability of establishing a Watch Committee Indications Center.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Watch Committee's visit to Headquarters, Air Defense Command (ADC) in August, 1953 stimulated interest in the need for an improved system to assist in the determining of the imminence of an attack, particularly an air attack, on the United States.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also visited Hq., ADC in August, 1953, and were duly impressed by the Indications Center maintained there.

DISCUSSION

4. There has been a long-standing need for an improved system to provide early warning of an imminent attack against the United States. Present deficiencies stem from human limitations rather than from any lack of interest, or diligence, on the part of those charged with the nation's safety. It is recognized that in past crisis situations, intelligence has been available indicating the impending crises. What has been lacking was a means of properly interpreting it, or, a means of remembering related items of intelligence so they could be interpreted. In themselves, many of the items were of little significance, but, taken collectively,

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*Distributed to members
of AD Hoc IAC Committee (Watch)
30 Oct '53*

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and correlated with subsequent events, these items could have served as danger signals. Thus, what is really needed is some system, be it mechanical, graphical, or otherwise, which will perform the all-important function of reliably indicating impending danger. Of course, the intelligence items, to serve this useful purpose, must be readily available in one place. (At present, the CIA is the only agency maintaining a comprehensive file of intelligence material of all types, and from all sources.)

5. Paragraphs (d), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 102, of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, assign to the CIA the duty of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. More specifically, the CIA is enjoined to make use of "appropriate existing agencies and facilities" for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence relating to National Security. Finally, the CIA is directed "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally". NSCID No. 1, in paragraphs 4 and 8, carries a repetition of the instructions in the National Security Act of 1947, referred to above. Paragraph 12 of NSCID No. 1 provides for the assignment of department and agency specialists to the CIA. It thus appears that the CIA, in addition to its own highly qualified specialists and analysts, also has on duty with it the necessary specialists to properly represent the viewpoints of the other departments and agencies. Paragraph 1, e, (1) of NSCID No. 3 indicates that the CIA is responsible for producing and disseminating national intelligence which is defined as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security".

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A study of the detailed instructions, which have been outlined above, creates the distinct impression that if an Indications Center is to be established, it should be located at the Central Intelligence Agency, and staffed and operated by that agency.

6. Paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1 outlines the procedure to be followed when any IAC member obtains information indicating an impending crisis situation such as an outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a condition which affects the security of the United States. Under this approved system, the best intelligence analysts of all parts of the government can be consulted before any final decision is reached, thus assuring, within the limitation of human frailties, that no crises go undetected, or that no false warnings are disseminated.

7. Prior attempts to draw up a valid list of indicators of the imminence of an attack against the United States have proven fruitless. Consequently, an attempt to select a list of indicators and reduce them to a graphical, or mechanical, basis is fraught with difficulties from the start. The shortcomings of graphical and mechanical devices are generally recognized. Therefore, the logic of establishing an Indications Center where any great measure of reliance would be placed on such devices appears of doubtful merit unless some provisions are made to test its reliability in competition with the present, approved system. If such a test period is attempted, it should be recognized that an Indications Center will reveal, initially, many imperfections which were not foreseen. Corrections can be made, but it may well be that some imperfections can never be corrected due to the shortcomings of mechanical and graphical devices already referred to above. This point again serves to indicate the inadvisability of placing any great faith in the Indications Center unless it proved itself over a long period of time, or until several major crises have occurred. At the very

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least, it is imperative that the security of the nation not be jeopardized by placing any degree of reliance on a new system which has definitely not proven itself. That is a risk which cannot be prudently taken at the IAC level.

8. One deficiency exists now, and will continue to exist for any alerting system which may be devised. It is based on the assumption (bordering on a fact, however) that information indicating an impending crisis will seldom be so clear-cut that additional information will not be required. Therefore, some provision should be made for making available, on a priority basis, the use of existing communications to obtain the necessary additional information. It may even be desirable to require the establishment of additional communications for the use of an Indications Center. At least that possibility should be investigated.

9. Another current deficiency is the lack of a specialized, cross-indexed, file of intelligence reports, correlated with subsequent events. The difficulty of organizing such a file appears beset with well-nigh insurmountable practical obstacles. However, if such a file could be devised, it should go a long way toward solving the problem of recognizing a critical situation in its early stages. If an Indications Center is to be established, experimentally, it would appear logical to make an attempt to devise such a file concurrently. This thought also serves to reinforce the arguments in favor of establishing any trial Indications Center at the CIA because only there will be found the combination of: trained personnel, already voluminous files, and mechanical systems for managing the files.

CONCLUSIONS

10. That the far-reaching importance of the IAC's responsibilities for providing timely warning of an imminent attack against the United States are such that the proposal of a system which shows

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any promise of aiding it in discharging those responsibilities should not be summarily dismissed.

11. That no reliance should be placed on any experimental Indications Center until it has unquestionably proven its validity.

12. That the efficacy of an Indications Center would be enhanced if a specialized cross-reference file of intelligence reports were developed as outlined in paragraph 9 above.

13. That the best place to test an experimental Indications Center is at the CIA where facilities and personnel already exist.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. That the Conclusions, paragraphs 10-13 inclusive, above be noted.

15. That an Indications Center be established at the Central Intelligence Agency on an experimental basis only, using CIA personnel and facilities.

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